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I. STRUCTURE OF ITALIAN BANKING SYSTEM
Classification of Italian Banks
1) The Bank of Italy
2) Public Law credit institutes, There are 5 of them, namly the
Banco di Napoli, the Banco di Sicilia, the ane nanmi=e1 del
lavoro, the Istituto San Paolo di Tori , the Monte dei Paschi
di Siena.
3) Banks of national interest. They are three in number, the Baneo
comrciale italiana, the Credito italiano and the Banco di Roma.
This category appears only in 1937 in the tables presented by the
Bank of Italy.
4) Joint stock baks. Their number is diminishirg steadily: 305 in
1933, 289 in 1934, 274 in 1935, 250 in 1936 ( 194 if we -exclude
those not actually operating, 191 if we also exclude the three
banks of the above paragraph ). As far as we know the data frm
1936 on, unlike those for previous years, include operating banks
only. Those were 149 in 1951,
5) The popular banks also called cooperative societies with limited
responsibility. Their number is also falling,
6) The rural and artisanal banks which are also known as cooperative
societies with unlimited responsibility. Their number is also falling.
7) Ordinary savings banks, and pledge banks, Their number is falling
slowly.
8) Banking houses, the number of which is falling very rapidly.
9) Branches of foreign bankes they were 6 before the ar, now only 2.
10) Institutes specialised in agricultural credit, real estate credit
and similar operations0 These institutes are few in number.
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A. A Historical Sumary
The creation of the Dank of Italy in 1893 in largely due to the severe
crisis of the banking system which manifested itself in the 1890's which were,
in Italy as in many countries, years of marked depression.
'Pe Bank of Italy results from the amalganation of three banks, the
Banca nazionale del Regoo the Manca nazionale Toscana and the Banca Toscana
di credito, into one institute. Its original capital was of 300,000 shares
of 1000 lire each, that is 300 million lire of which 210 million only were
actually paid up.
Unlike many other central banks, the Dank of Italy has often inaurred
substantial losses, and before the turn of the century it proved necessary to
reduce its capital by 60 million lire; its shareholders gave up claims amount-
Ing to 80 million, and accepted the burden of an 58 million lire loss follow-
Ing the liquidation of the anca Bomana. Dividends were frequently low be-
cause of the manngement's wish to increase the strength of the bank.
From the foundation of the Bank of Italy until 1926, the privilege of
issuing notes was not the Dankis exclusivity but was shared with the Danco di
Napoli and the Banco di Sicilia. Shwever the Bank was meant to assume grade-
ually the role of a unique central bank and with the return to a rising price
trend the Bank's activities Increased significantly as a brisk economic act-
ivity suceeded to a protracted stagnation. In particular the metallic reserve
grew spectacularly as well as the metallic backing of each bank note; the act-
ive operations of the Bank trebled.
Until the first world war, little was changed in the organisation of
structure of the Bank except that various laws were modified in order to in-
corporate into the legislation texts more in harmony with the situation
brought about by economic growth ( i.e. absolute limitations on the volume
of the note circulation, on the amount of interest yielding deposits, etc. ).
During the first world war, the Mank had to modify its regulation in
order to assist in the war effort, which naturally meant inflation.
The portfolio representing the assistance given by the Bank to the
Italian economy reached a mnxiim in 1922, a year marked IV some banking
difficulties.
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In 1926 the Bank of Italy became the soe note issuing institution
of the country, and in 1927 it received the task of maintaining the exchange
value of the lira between the gold points as Italy adopted the gold ex.
change standard. The accounting surplus value arising from the reevaluation
of the gold stock acoording to the new gold definition of the currency ws
used by the state in order to cancel indebtedness incurred during and after
the war. The absolute limit to the circulation was abolished but the Bank
assumed the obligation of maintaining a reserve of gold and foreign ex-
change amounting to at least 40% of the might liabilities.
In 1928 the capital was increased from 240 to 500 mLion lire, whilst
the actually paid up capital rose from 180 to 300 million, the present day
figure. The obligations of the Bank to the goernment were modified, scme
restrictions on the type of investment permitted to the Bank ware removed.
The world depression brought about-a drastic fall in the gold and for.
eign exchange reserves of the Bank from 11 071 million in 1928 to 3 *395 mil-w
lions in 1935. Exchange control was ino oed at the end of 1934, 1qortquotas set in 1935, the minimum backing of the currency removed, and at the
end of 1936 the gold parity of the lira was reduced by W1.
Bank niots circlation fell until 1934 after which time its evolution
depended on political rather than economic conditions.
The large increase in the operations of the Bank in 1931 and 1932 is
due to the assistance of the Bank to the conrcial banks which the depres-
sion made illiquid; the Bank also lent assistance to the institute constit-
uted to liquidate insolvent concerns, and then to the IRI 'hich was created
in 1933, to the Consortium for advanoes on industrial stocks eto.. Later,
the portfolio of the Bank also increased because of the Treasury financing
and the investment program iich aimed at "autarclq.
Of real significance is the banking law of 1936 which transformed the
Bank of Italy into a so-called Pulic Law Institute mare close3y suboardin-
ated to the authority of -he State. This law decided that henceforth the
capital of the Bank could be held exclusively by, savings banka, credit in-
stitutions, banks of national interest, insurance ampanies. The necessary
transfer uns made and on December 31st, 1945 savings banks held 59.3% of
the stock; public law credit institutes and banks of national interest 25.2%1
insurance concerns 0.5%; "Istituti di previdensa", 25%.
The collection of saving as well as the distrIbution of credit were
declared to be matters of public interest, The Bank of Italy ws forbidden
to engage henceforth to discount paper presented by clients other than
banks. The council of ministers assumed the authority to forulate credit
policies and was to be assisted in that function by a "Corporation" and by a
technical committee of said corporation. An organisation called "Comptrollers
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corps for the protection of saving and the administration of credit" ws
created the head of which was to be also governor of the Bank of Italy;
this non-political organization which is held to have wielded imch power
is also believed to have duplicated, to some extent, the activities of the
Bank of Itay. A "law-decree" of 1944 abolished it and attributed its pre-
rogatives to the ministry of the Treasury except for the direct control
over comnercial banks given to the Bank of Italy.
During the second world war the credits and advances of the Bank to
the Treasury amounted to 352.5 billion lire of varying purchasing poerl
the amount of notes created only to be handed over immediately to the
Treasury was 260.8 billion lire.
B0 Organisation of the Bank of Italy
The administration and control of the bank are exercised by#
a) The general Assembly
b) The superior council and its comittee
c) The governor, the director general and the vice-director general
The right of vote in the assembly is regulated:.1 vote for each
100 shares up to 500 shares and 1 vote for each subsequent group of
500 shares, No participant of the votes has more than 50 Votes. The
deliberations of the assembly are valid when sanctioned by the majority
of the votes, the poll taking in consideration only those participants
who are present.
The superior council is made up of the governor and 15 counselors,
12 of which are elected by the genral assembly. In 1946 it was not yet
clear who would nominate the other 3 because that function was, prior to
the liberation of Italy, held by an abolished institution. The committee
of this superior council is composed of the governor, of four canmlors
nominated by the superior council, of the director general ( who votes when
consulted ) and the vice-director general acting as a secretary. The superior
council administers the BankI its most important functions are:
a) to determine, subject to legislative texts, the way in which the
bank will operate.
b) to establish or modify the internal regulations of the Bank
c) to nominate or fire the personnel of the Banks, including the
governor, the director and the vice governor, subject for the last three
mentioned to the approval of a decree issued by the Prime Minister and
signed by the minister of the Treasury when the council of ministers has
been heard.
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The governor legally represents the Bank in relation with third parties0He determines the disposition of funds among various operations or employ-
ments, is in charge of operations concerning goverment bonds and foreign
currencies; proposes to the minister of the Treasury changes in discount
rates and rates on advances; controls metallic reserves, foreign exchange
reserves and current accounts abroad. He must be assisted by the comuittee
when deciding on extraordinary operations proposed by the branches*
3) Banks of National Interest
Ao La banca commerciale italiana
This bank was constituted at the end of 1894, soon after the dis-
astrous fall of the Societi generale di credito mobiliare and of the
Banca generale
Its original capital was 20 million lire distributed as follows a
Berliner Handels Gesellschaft 2,9628,9000 lire
Deutsche Bank ido
Bank fur Handel und Industrie ido
Lo Bleichroder 296329000
Disconto Gesellschaft 2,628,000
Dresdner Bank do
TOTAL GERMAN BANKS 15,772,000
IoRo privilegiato stabilimento di credito e industria,
Vienna 2,628,000
TOTAL AUSTRIA HUNGARY
Basler Bankverein
Union financiere de Genrve
Soci ti de credit Suisse
TOTAL SWITZERLAND
ido
500,000
ido
ido
1,500,000
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Conte Sanseverino Vimercati, Milano 100,000
TOTAL ITALY id
GRAND TOTAL 20,000,000
The extremely reduced Italian participation is presumably duo to
the difficult situation of the country at that tim . To compensate
this, the statutes made it compulsory for the President to be an Italiano
Organised on the model of German banks, the Banca cammerciale invested
in railroads, shipping, but especiafly in electric companies; abroad it
created a bank in Brasile anwhile, the capital increased at a rapid rate,
control being lost by the Germans to Italians; French interests became
significant. After the First World War it extended its activity in many
countries, notably Austria, Rumania, Czachoslovakia, Yugoslavia. Until the
depression of the 19300s it seems to have been a very profitable enterprise,
of great significance in many lines of industries.
B. Il credito italiano
Formed in 1895, it proceeds from the Banca di Genova reinforced by
the investment of German capital. The original capital was 20 million lireo
It has invested in electric power companies, shipping, aid foreign
banks. As in the ease of the Banca comerciale, the German interests became
eventually fairly small0  The Fiat and Snia Viscosa companies acquired, and
eventually disposed of, large interests in the bank.
Co Il Banco di Roma
The Banco di Roma was created in 1880 with an initial capital of 6 million
lire, Its beginnings were difficult so that by the end of 1894 its capital
had to be reduced to 2.5 mllions. It developed very well, however, with the
return of prosperity, lending to agriculture, doing business in Egypt,
Abyssinia, Morocco, Turkeyo It interested itself in small tonnage shipping,
in trade and investment in Africa. In 1909 it absorbed an insurance company
of Naples, and two years later the Banco di Liguria, The Banco di Roma
suffered seriously from international instability ( 1912 war with Turkey and
subsequent Balkan wars ) and from the First World War. After the world war,
Italy
Econ/
-6 -
its expansion was renewed on a perilous basis, because it twice needed
governmental assistance.
Do La banca nazionale di credito
This bank no longer exists.
5) The Popular Banks
They are local or regional banks usually constituted, from the legal
viewpoint, as cooperative companies with limited responsibility. This cooper-
ative aspect is important, or at least it has been in the past, but the pop-
ular banks do grant loans to others than the members of the cooperative
movement.
Luigi Luzzatti, one of the most important Italian statesmen of the
nineteenth century, is regarded as having played a prominent role in the
launching and in the development of the popular banks; he had upheld the
view that the responsibility of the popular banks should be a limited one,
and this view eventually prevailed.
The first popular banks were constituted in the 1860's, and granted
loans to the members of the cooperative movement exclusively, on the pledge
of the shares they owned, or on their commercial paper ( usually short-term
discounts ). They accepted deposits in current account and then savings
deposits as well.
The Italian commercial code of 1882 extended to the popular banks the
rules applying to cooperative organisations in general with the result
that shares had to be nominative, that no one should have more than 5,000
lire's worth of nominal capital and that each member had one vote irres=
pective of the sise of his holdings,
The following table gives an idea of the growth of the popular banks:
YEAR MJNBER QAPITAL DEPOSITS
6 8 1,940,000 -
1870 50 1 L.922000 32.687.000
1875 109 M2,34800 14,6600
1880 14__ -0,610,0 179,98,000
188 Wa7 7j9,308,0 32,93.o
1890 693 118 23I.00 209 00090 61k 1 18.122.3-0 0 0 3894.00
1902 736 108013000
908 736 16155 ,ooo 971,167,000
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In 1908 the geographical distribution of the
as follows:
A detailed account for the
popular banks was
other provinces is not available in our source.
As Mr. Giuseppe Lansarons notes, this table would lead to the inference
that popular banks have developed with the greatest success in those provftinces where the scarcity of capital was most to be deplored.
It seem from the data that popular banks have not maintined after
the First World War their previous rate of growth, the increases being
attributable to the higher price level rather than to effective growth in
real termvs. Their deposits stood at about 4 billion lire in 1922, 4.5
billion lire in 1925, 5 billion in 1930, 6 billion in 1939. Meanwhile
their number has been falling steadily.
For recent years, we have:
YEAR NUMBER "SPORTELLI OWN FUNDS SAVINGS DEPOSITS
1939 267 971 583.9 5,924
1940 253 946 658.A 7,210
1941 247 954 709.1 9,478
1942 240 962 780.3 12,840
1943 235 957 - 16, 7 17
1944 235 957 27, 12 2
1945 233 959 1,242,6 46, 155
1946 232 1,030 1,748.0 80, 172
Piemonte 32
Lombardia 77
Veneto 75
E0milia 76
Marche 62
Toscana 48
Campani 104
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In view of the rise in prices, this apparent growth constitutes
a contraction in real terms. However, this phenomenon appears to hold
for the entire banking system; when deflated the deposits for the postwar
period are less important in the post war period than in the prewar per-
iod, despite the growth in output and population
The geographical distribution at the end of 1946 was as follows:
PROVINCE NUMBER OF BANKS NUMBER OF "SPORTELLI
Piemonte 9 175
Liguria 7
Lombardia 25 335
Venesia T, 1 1
Veneto 32 180
Venezia Go 1 14
Emilia 23 62
Toscana 14 32
Marche 15 27
Umbria 19 37
Lasio 15 22
Abruzsi Mo 3 5
Campania 14 23
Puglie 18 27
Lucania 7 13
Calabria 14 23
Sicilia 21 37
Sardegna 1 10
232 1030
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Two popular banks deserve a special mention, the Banca popolare di
Novara and the Banca popolare di Milano.
The Banca popolare di Novara was created in 1871 by 120 shareholders
who had one share each. At the end of 1946 it had 29,040 uhareholders who
held 1,556,547 shares of 100 lire each ( nominal vaUe ? ).
Its deposits have increased as follows:
END OF LIRE
1900 10 0
19 10
-0 00
000
The Banca popolare di Novara has 210 branches, mostly in Piemonte,
Lombardia, Liguria and Veneto, and an office in Rome.
The Banca popolare di Milano was formed in 18651 at the end of one
year it had 1,153 shareholders, 217,700 lire of capital and 340,000 lire
of demand deposits. In 1873 it accepted savings deposits.
The growth has been as follows:
YELR CLPITAL CURRENT ACCOUNTS SAVINGS DEPOSITS
1875 7*191s250 12,,549,000 18 6000
1900 070
_ 
_ I- 
- - i----
7) The banks ( _asse di riprmio )
They were at the origin irutiutions not purely .created and managed
for the profit motive, but meant to have a social sipnificanoe by enourm
aging saving in the lower income brackets of the population.
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Their funds were employed in a very conservative manner in safe
and liquid investments, possibly because of their aims and of the nature
of the depositors, who unl ik wealthy capitalists, could ill afford to
take risks with their small savings. It proved, however, difficult to find
such employment for these savings, outside of loans to agriculture -- it-
self a limited financial field.
It is not surprising that there should have been a significant ev-
olution of the savings banks, from the early to the present days, in the
matter of savings collection as well as in the employment of these savings.
Original limitations such as the nominative character of accounts,
the maxim=m limit on deposits, the interdiction made to an individual to
open several savings accounts, were gradually removed, and accounts which
could be drawn upon by checks were created. This may have facilitated the
growth of the savings banks which, before the second world war held a large
proportion of the nation's time deposits, demand deposits remaining at a
comparatively low figure. This state of affairs was modified tbr the wr
inflation creating in depositors a desire to increase the liquidity of
tneir holdings subject to monetary depreciation.
To a considerable extent, the portfolio of the savings banke is made
up of government bonds, 1hich were a sound investment before the First
World War, especially in periods of falling prices when industrial profits
were low; the proportion of these government bonds within the total of assets
has been steadily increasing, which in periods of inflation is no doubt a
hip to the Treasury, but a not lose to the savings banks unless they should
be, as is conceivable in such periods, unable to find another employment for
the funds, This increase is presumably to be explained not so much by the
intention of the banks than by the needs of the Treasury. Of a somewhat
similar nature are the savings banks' holdings of bonds floated by semiupublic
institutions such as the IMI the Consortium for advances on industrial stocks,
etco. Investments in stocks or bonds of private businesses are an infrequent
Occurrence,
TABILE I
Pata Concerning Si Banks
END OF TOTAL INIEX DEPOSITI INDEX CONTI CORR. INDEX
DEPOS. FIDUCIARI DI CRRISP.
19 8 9, 100 18,66 200 -506--- 100J
1 9 19,000 10718,66 30 3 26.3
1940 20,122 1%.9 19,a423 .69 13 *1
194_ _ _ -2s48 2A9AW* ,3 L
19 8510 7650 ,301
17 37.38 121,J16 16,222
197215,359, 17597 39J7
ItaF/
FcO-O/A
YEAR SECURITIES MORTGAGES MOSTLY COMMERCo MOSTLY AGRICULO
% OF ASSETS % OF ASSETS % OF ASSETS % OF ASSETS
1931 29.07 9.1 18.12 11.36
1932 31.33 9.09 1832 9.15 --
193 ---- 35064- .51 - 1808 --- ,24193 674 78-18.52 6
1 37.5 7.0 19~.85i936 39.9 7.34 20.0 5.02
1937 3658 6099 17,~U _-~-~-_-~
19315 35071 15.34 506
1M9 35."9 7.2 1,, 528 -
36.55 7.63 14.50 5.53
"Depositi fiduciari" are generally translated into English as "savings
deposits", " conti correnti di corrispondensg'as "current seoMts". How-
ever, some tables indicate that in some cases, a notice is necessary in
order to draw funds from certain types of "conti correnti di corrispondensa"
TABLE II
Italy. Data on the savings banks at the end of 1946. Source: report of
the savings banks' association for the year 1946; the data are
reproduced by Mr. Giuseppe Lanaarone in his book, "Il sistema banario
italiano," which we have used.
In thousands of
lire
SAVINGS BANKS NUMBER "SPORTELLI" DEPOSITS OWN FUNDS
Piemonte 11 23 2
1= ~rdis ~ 2129 a20
7 
99
Lae 02 .3~
4 19 24 2 8
enes- o . 1 . 2 .9..16
14" 14. 16 215 19,365156 D8-3C
Taecna 9267 1 179T294 -222 79
Mace91413 605 W8- 88108
Nasro' 2. 10. -- a 2
Ia Ei 5U 4 028 619
Calabria 1 .0.0$ 7.2
Sicilia 1 115- ,F,493 210
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It appears from this list that some provinces are not included, presum-
ably because there are no savings banks in these provinces; Mr. Lasarone
does not say so explicitly.
II. THE PROLEM CF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT
1. Sources of Agricultural Credit
There has been a great deal of legislation on this matter, especially
in 1869, 1887, 1922, 1923 and 1927.
The law of 1869 was aimed to provide a uniform legislation for the
newly created state; it authorized the creation of institutes speciulised
in agricultural credit of not more than 90 days with the possibility of
renewal up to a duration of one year. The assistance afforded to agrioult-
urists was to be limited by their solvency or by the guarantees and collat-
eral they could offer to the credit institutes; a great amount of leeway was
given to b5orrowers regarding the use to which they were to put the money.
The institutes created in conformity with this law numbered 4 in 1870, 14
in 1875 but 9 only in 1884 whilst, in the years of greatest activity, the
credits granted reached the 30 million lire level.
The law of 1887 copletely changed the previous organisation of agri-
cultural credit. It abolished the principle of specialisation, permitting
all banks including the note issuing banks to extend their activity in
that directions it strengthned the principle of "rsal guarntee, that is,
it laid the rule that loans should not be made if the lending institution
ware not given a legal right on some type of property, thus enabling it to
reimburse itself jiuickly and surely in case of default; it ala-o laid the
fundamental distinction between credits granted 'for the purpose of running
an agricultural business ( bridging a tai lag between expense. and receipts )
and credits granted for the purpose of carrying out improvements, these is-
provents being analysed in some detal. It finally provided for govermnt
interference in the determination of the rate of interest. It does not appear
that many banks availed themselves to any considerable extent of the permission
granted to them to engage in agricultural credit.
After 1901 various laws were made for individual areas, until 1922 during
vhich year a text o f national scope was enacted, strengthening the separation
between the various types of credits, ordinary, for improvement, for transfor-
mation, acquisition and creation, as well as the privileges and guarantees of
the lending institutions. Al banks were to be permitted to maks the ordinary
agricultural credit held to be short-term and self liquidating. But in 1925
they were also permitted to make loans used for agricultural improvements.
Meanwhile other legisilation determined the scope of the State assistance for
the same purpose of agricultural improvemento
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The law enacted in 1927 still applied at the end of the second
world waro Its main lines are as follows:
Only those banks and institutions which have the sanction of the law
or the consent of the government can engage in operations of agricultural
credit. The following can do so for az type of credit:
Institutes for agricultural credit of Piemonte, Liguria
Toscana, Central Italy and Sardegna
The specialized sections of the Federal Institute of Venetian
savings banks, of the savings bank of the Lobardian provinces, of the Banco
di Napoli and of the Banco di Sicilia
The Banca nasionale del lavoro
The Banca nasionale dellgagricoltura
Others are restricted to credits consented for the purpose of carrying
out improvements; they are:
The National Consortium of agricultural credit for improvements
The specialized sections of the Venetian "Istituto di credito
fondiario"
Finally almost every other type of bank or lending institution can
apply to the government for permission to engage in some form of agricult-
ural credit; article 22 of the law, however, states that for this last group
no State assistance in the matter of interest on credits extended for improve-
ment purposes will be granted, which effectively discourages the group to
make applications.
It appears from questionnaires prepared by the Economic Commission which
reported to the Constituent Assembly that expert opinion is Unanimous in
approving the principle of specialized institutes in the field of agricult-
ural credit.
In view of the iportance attached by the law to the distinction made
between ordinary credit and credit for improvement purposes, it may not be
amiss to reproduce briefly the legal definitions of these categories.
The following are held to be ordinary loans: those which are used for
the manipulation and transformation of agricultural products, for the purchase
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of livestock machinery and implements, for the payment of incidental expen-
see such as taxes or insurance premiums, for the settling of debts, for the
maintenance of normal inventories; those which result from advances made on
bonded goods; those which are consented to agricultural societies for all
the purposes stated above plus that of meeting expenses incidental to the
collective sale of products.
Examination of the data shows that the quasi-totality of ordinary loans
have taken the form of advances on bonded products, or of loans to agricultural
societies. The credits extended for the purpowe of facilitating the acquisition
of liestock or machinery have remained at an insignificant percentage of
total credits during the war; the data show a steady rise from 1944 on, but
the percentage share is still low0
It may be observed that if the credits merely bridge the gap between
the farmers' expenditures aid receipts, they are not much different from the
credits granted to traders for instance, and are hardly agricultural credits
in a specialised sense, except that the collateral offered is different and
involves different legal points.
The following are held by article 3 to be purps es of improvement:
Acquisition of land to create small properties
Construction, transformation and repairs of elevators, ware-
houses and other buildings for collective use
Transformation of the land itself e.g. by irrigation etc..
Examination of the data show that most of the credits have been used
for improvements in the strict sense, that is rural construction of buildings
and roads, irrigation etc., and only a small proportion used for the purpose
of acquiring land.
Opinion has been expressed than an unduly high proportion of agricult-
ural loans have been consented to large land-owners whilst less wealthy
agriculturists have little or no access to such credits; although there exist
same data I and some estimates in this matter, there will always be a diff-
erence of opinion concerning the definition of large or small property. At
aqr rate, it is suggested that the matter could be corrected if laborers and
small landowners were to form cooperatives which would then be in a better
1. The data are those of the National Consortium of agricultural credit for
improvements.
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position to do business with the lerding institutions, In view of the fact
that the State consents fiscal privileges to the institutes for agricultural
credit, which fact involves a decrease in tax receipts; and in view of the
fact that a high percentage of taxes are indirect taxes, it appears all the
more desirable to enable small landowners or even laborers to have access to
credit facilities; for it is seen that, via the fiscal system, those who are
excluded from credit facilities contribute financially to the credit system
vhich ignores them, and pay for the reduction of interest rates charged to
the large landowners.
The Financing of Trasactions Arising from the Normal Activities
( Operasioni di esercisio )
In million lire
of Agriculture
END OF SPECIAL INSTIIUTES AUTHORIZED TOTAL
YFAR AND BANCA NAZ. DEL INSTITUTES
LAVORO
1928 598.7 103.6- 702.
1929 634.6 22.6
545. -
59O.7 26&2 9
1934i 589. .59+
1935 20109 .n28.
d a 9
JYJO 751.9
Source: Appendice alla relazione; rapporto della commissions
all'assemblea costituente, IV - 2 p.654.
economica presentato
Professor Giovanni 'Nicotra observes that these figures are not complete
because they do not include, for the special institutes at least, the ad-
vances corresponding to privileges given to the lender on agricultural
products. This deserves careful consideration.
2. Is a ultur credit sufficiently developed in Ita_3?
A definite answer in the negative is given by Professor Giovanni Nicotra
in an annex to the report of the Economic Commission presented to the Con-
- R W - I
2,508.6
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stituent Assembly, IV - 2 ( Appendice alla relazione ) pp.652-657.
Professor Nicotra analyses the available data from as early a date as
is possible, namely 1871.
The first period euained extends from 1871 to 1887 this last year
being chosen because it witnessed important legal changes in the organisation
of agricultural credit0 The data are the following:
END OF NUMBER OF DISCOUNTS AND AGRICULTURAL BORD
INSTITUTES ADVANCES(million lire) IN CIRCULATION (million lire
191_ _10 5.3 2.0
1875 1 _ 18.2-.
1881 13 31.7 12.2
1885 12 3.0 11.0
1887 11 27.7 9.9
The gross returns of agriculture in 1885 were estimated at 4.7 billion
lire, not including products considered secondary such as fruits, eggs, etc.
The necessary expense for such a production was held to be about 50% of the
gross returns, exclusive of improvements, that is, this expense ma estimated
at approximately 2.3 billion lire; it then appears that 30 million lire of
discounts and advances to a business operating with an expenditure of 2.3
billion lire do not constitute a very significant assistance0 According to
Prof. Nicotra, the exact amount of agricultural credit is below the recorded
figure because the banks were granting coesrcial loans under the appearance
of agricultural credit in order to derive the benefit of fiscal advantages
and agricultural bond floatation -- such a state of affairs being well known
to all observers.
The second period extends from 1887 to 1901, fram whicb date legislation
became regional instead of national. A similar table gives:
END OF NUMBER OF DISC00NTS AND AGRICULTURAL BONDS
INSTITUTES ADVANES(million lire) IN CIRCUIATION (million lire)
1888 11 33.06
1890 10 28.7 .8 
1692 9 25.5
1898 7 14.9 1.4
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The failure is of course obvious.
For the third period, 1901-1922, there are no inclusive data and,
therefore, Prof. Nicotra presents data pertaining to the operations of
three institutes, the Banco di Napoli, the Bao di Sicilia and the
Istituto di oredito agrario per il Lasio, which he thinks granted about
8/10 tha of the agricultural credit.
YFAR VOLUME OF OPERATIONS ( operasioni effettuate )
1910 23.2
1915 39.3
1920 120.5
1922 114.5
This would indicate som improvenmwnt; naturally the rise in the
general price level must be taken into account,
4th period: 1922-1927. There are still no coplete data, but the
important institutes are now four with the functioning of the agricultural
credit section of the Federal Institute of credit "per le tre Venesie"
YEAR VOLUME OF OPERATIONS ( operazioni effettuate )
1923 219.1
192.5 .332.6
192T- 361o2
This would seem to be a substantial increase,
5th periods 1927-1944. The tables presented are numerous, and we have
reproduced them on separate pages. We propose here to sun up the argumentation
of Prof. Nicotra.
His first point is that the increase in the volume of agricultural
credit ( esercisio ) from 1934 to 1938 Is an apparent, not a real increase;
this is so essentially because the increase is made up of advances on products,
wheat, corn etc., which are really coaercial operations, rather than credit
to agriculture; also, whilst there is little or no increase in the loans to
be used for the purchase of cattle and machinery or the month-to-month operations,
there is an increase in the loans to organizations and associations; further-
more, prices were rising as follows: 1928 - 100; 1935 -. 68.2; 1936 - 76.;
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1937 - 89.1; 1938 -- 95.3.
Prof. Nicotra is of the opinion that the special institutes for
credit to agriculture hardly deserve their name because honest-to-goodness
agricultural credit is not their essential activity; he also thinks that
the credit facilities given to agriculture are not much greater than they
had been generations ago.
He reproduces from Professor Felice Vinci's book "Il socialismo d'oggi"
an estimate of the gross product of Italian agriculture in 1938, namely 43.l
billion lire; always using the 50% ratio as above explained, he concludes
that this production has been possible because the agriculturists have spent
21.6 billion lire; and since agricultural loans not of advances on products
reached 1,073.3 million lire on Dec. 31st, 1948, it appears that the assist-
ance afforded by the banking system amounts to about 5% of the funds actuatLy
expended during the process of production. This assistance represents 37.6
lire per usable tract of 10,000 square meters ( ettaro ). The interpretation
of Prof. Nicotra's text is delicate, but our understanding is that this fig.
ure of 1,073.3 million lire has been derived from data pertaining only to the
special institutes, which means that the authorized institutes are excluded -
and perhaps also the Banca nasionale del lavoro; if these were included the
percentage calculated above might go up from 5 to 7% - this is of course a
guess, because all the necessary data are not available.
Professor Nicotra states that it is safe to conclude that the desired
expansion of agricultural credit would be furthered if the authorization to
engage in that line of credit were given more liberally.
The situation in the field of agricultural credit for purposes of im-
provement is somewhat better, largely because of the creation in 1928 of the
Consorsio nasionale per il credito agrario di miglioramento; this institute
granted in 1938 over half of the loans.
However, Prof. Nicotra is dissatisfied here too, because he finds that
30% of the loans granted by the Consorsio are not actually invested in rural
iqprovement projects, but used for purchase of land, extinction of past debts,
public works within the spbere of action of the State -- for this latter type
of operations, there is of course no need for an agricultural bank , but &
need for a direct outlay of a strong Treasury . Furthermore, part of the loans
granted for rural constructions are used-for collective constructions which are
useful no doubt, but further restrain the capital which is made available to
individual enterprises.
Prof. Nicotra concludes that agricultural credit for improvement in agri-
culture is insufficient in view of the country's needs, especially since the war
losses suffered by Italian agriculture are estimated at 385 billion lire ( 1946
value ? ) But there must be a market for agricultural bonds in order to raise
the necessary capital.
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Italy. TABLE III
Geographical distribution of the "normal" ( esercisio ) agricultural
credit ,consented by the special institutes December 31st, 1938. In
thousand~s o:28 3.
PROVINCE AMUNT OF WHICH ADVANCES 1 Minas 2 3 PER fa
ON PRODUCTS
Pimonte 236,-41 199 391 ,146?
igria2,091. 16506 985 .9
Labeta 66;79534t MY9 131,890 65.@
veWsia T. 3#797 3s762 35 0 03 -
VMW 5.7 g17S 4ZOT44 5
tarAL NOR
Emlia R. 2722147 126,889 1i5,258 71.98
Tosana131,61 2 7,#9 124,5W10567
.ach 166,75 1353,335 33460362
umoia.it 62,70 2 5.
TaAL C-N
Lasio 1 66,891 172 28.76
Abruzzl 107- 97 2119a25 0
Cnanta 68 145 88IS 22,456 17.5A
TOTAL COWS
Pugi5 365894 30,121 43 773 235
Lucasa g io 129osa090 11.05w..1.
na_*_a00,9 513 19 90 1.33
TOTL SOUl!
SIOILIA 286,451 18,138 ? 2,313 110,00 j
SARDEGNA 34,567 5,580 ? 28,987 12.47
ITALIA 3,379,03 2,305,752 1,073,291 37.60
The purpose of this table is to show
credit of the "esercizio" type is made up
the extent to which agricultural
of advances on products, a comer-
P 
.. . ;
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cial rather than an agricultural operation, at axy rate only one of the
various operations envisaged by the law. The significance of the table is
badly reduced by the fact that it includes the special institutes only, iich
leaves the passtblity that aggregate figures would show an altogether dif-
ferent picture.
Source: Appendice alla relazione; rapporto delle <omissione economica presen-
tato all'assemblea costituente, IV - 2 p. 655.
TABLE IV
Italy. Agricultural Credit. Operations having improvements
( Operazioni di miglioramento ) In mill n lire. as a purpose
END OF SPECIAL INSTIT. CONSORZIO AUTHORIZED TOTAL
YEAR AND BANCA NAZ. NAZIONALE INSTITUTES
DEL LAVORO
1928 223.7 17.0 U.5 28 2
1929 392.3 207.8 13.4 613.6
13 422.0 338 15.2 751.0
1931 463.7 411.3 16.1 591.1
1932 5W. 692 -7.*7 -9.0
LY_ 573.556.29.0 1,12.7
1934 587.9 706.3 11.4 _3_3.6
193> 579.5 660.2 13.6 2530
93ob.3 680.6 2.0 12.
1937 691.4 741.8 17.6 5 0.8
1933 754.0 07571.
Source: Appendice alla relasios; rapporto delia cosisisioae economics.
presentato all'assemblea costituente. IV .. 2 p. 656.
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III. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (F ITALIAN BANKS
Little was known on this matter until an investigation was made in
1945-46 by the Economic Committee of the Ministry for the Constituent
Assembly in order to ascertain the concentration of banking capital ownership.
Mr. Emmanuele Riensi, who made the survey, has presented his results
in the Quarterly Review of the Banca nazionale del lavoro of April 1947, and
they are therefore accessible to the reader who is not familiar with the
Italian language.
Mr. Riensi begins his study by comparing the concentration of share
ownership between various types of companies. The companies included in
the survey had, on Dec. 31st, 1945, a capital of over a million lire, number-
ed 3,300 approximately, had 950,000 share-holders, over 66 billion lire of
capital, and employed about 1,300,000 peraons.
It appears that for corporations as a whole, .13% of the shareholders
owned 56.4% of the capital, whilst 83.33% of the shareholders only held
6.1%. A somewhat similar situation is found in the various broad categories.
The concentration of ownership is always very high.
The banking companies which Mr.. Riensi then examines in much greater
detail are those which on Dec.31st, 1945, had a capital of more than 10
million lire and most of those which at the sam date had a capital comprised
between 1 and 10 million lire. It is pointed out that, in view of the in-
flation, the nominal capital loses part of its significance. Excluded are
all the savings banks and the Public Law credit institutes on account of their
public character, and all banking companies prevented by law from accepting
demand deposits. The most significant cooperative banks have been included.
So that the data refer to 77 banking companies and to 27 cooperative banks;the nominal aggregate capital and reserves of the first group amounted to
almost 3.8 billion lire or about 35% of the capital funds of the 365 principal
credit institutes, their deposits stood at over 190 billion lire or 45% of
total; the 27 cooperative banks ( out of a total of 114 ) had capital and
reserves of 760 million lire, 41.1 billion lire of deposits, that is, 63% of
the capital funds and 82% of the deposits of all cooperative banks.
The 77 banking companies are divided into two groups, group (a) con-
sisting of 69 banks dominated by individuals or corporate bodies, group (b)
8 banks controlled directly or indirectly by the State. Identification of
the two groups, is, according to Mr. Riensi, easy. However, Mr. Rienui does
not state the extent of the State's participation in the banks dominated by
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private capital, which is most inconvenient, because if this participation
of 1 shareholder is of, say, 20% of the stock, it makes an enormous differ-
ence in the matter of concentration.
We need not consider at great length the sector dominated by the State,
because private participation in it is insignificant. Naturally, as seen
from another point of view, this is the most important sector, because along
with the public law credit institutes, the savings banks and the postal saving
system, it has no less than 76% of the deposits.
The so-called private group, then, defined as explained above, is divided
in three categories, category I made up of banking companies with over 50
million lire of capital, category Il made up of banidg companies the capital
of which is comprised between 50 and 10 rmlion Lire, and lastly category III
including those banks which have a capital of less than 10 but more than 1
million lire.
CATEGORIES NUMBER OF CAPITAL SHAREHOLIERS HAVING SHARE VALUE
COMPANIES IN MILL. OVER 500,00 LIRE THEY HAVE
NUMBER % AMOUNT %
Class I 3 380 37 0.125 227,846,300 60
Class II 20 582 116 0.56 384,238,570 66
Class II 46 177.9 61 1 0.44 94*920280 3
!I3~r~!r707#00597M__ 62
A more detailed analysis of ownership will be given on a special page.
Let us briefly mention here that, for the so-called private group:
214 shareholders or 0.32% hold 62% of the capital
66,303 shareholders or 99.68% hold 38% of the capital
If ve now turn our attention to the 27 cooperative banks, we find a much
lesser degree of concentration in ownership, a state of affairs which is pre-
sumably due in part to a legal provision limiting at 50,000 lire the value of
the shares which any individual shareholder may have,
International capital has no large participations in Italian banks.
Barclay's Bank, the American Express Company, and the Banca d'America e
d'Italia had on Dec. 31st, 1945, a capital of 252,500,000 lire or 8.8% of
the total capital invested in the 77 banking companies.
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IV THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BANKINO SYSTEM BETWEEN THE TWO
10RLD WARS
It has been noted above that the large Italian banks, som of them
created by German capital, were of the German type, that is, they 1ere
deposit banks and at the same time they were investment banks, launohing
industrial ventures necessitating long term illiquid investments. This
state of affairs contrasts with the tendency, assumed in France by the
largest commercial bank , the Credit Lyonnais which, under the guidance of
Henri Germain, restricted itself to commercial short term discounts and
systematically avoided long term illiquid investments. Those were handled
by the "banques d'affaires" the most important of which was the Banque de
Paris et des Pays Bas.
It is of course possible for all sorts of banks to becom e insolvent in
a severe depression, but it is quite clear that a bank of the German type
is more exposed to danger than a bank of the Credit Lyonnais type, becanse
of the drastic fall in share values and the drying up of income from divid-
ends, such income being susceptible to become negative in the sense that it
may turn out necessary to provide funds far the threatened firms in order to
prevent immediate. disaster. In a low income country such as Italy, it may
prove impossible to gather strength enabling the bank to wait until things
improwee
The first banking difficulties manifested themselves in 1921 with the
fall of the Banca Italiana di sconto which, having made large investments in
shipping and cotton, was hit by the fall in price of maritime freight and
other goods and services. The Facta government - the last government be-
fore the rise of fascism to power -- did intervene, arranging that the Bank
of Italy should advance to creditors the sums they were entitled to under
the agreement made after bankruptcy, when the liquidation of assets did not
permit to recover said sum.
In order to handle public opinion ( presumably ) the funds, really pro**
vided by sheer note printing, were administered by an "autonomous special
section" added ad hoc to a sleepy organisation called the Consortium for ad-
vances on industrial stocks. Such a method has been resorted to in every
country with disorderly finances, but the Italians may perhaps claim to have
discovered the device.
This autonomous special section was to limit its operations to a billion
lire, but when it appeared that the Banco di Roma, one of the country's
largest banks, would fail, such a limitation was removed.
The organism through which help was extended to banks and other businesses
took the name of Istituto di 3iquidasione.
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'his Istituto di liquidasione has given financial assistance to
the following:
Banca italianadi sconto
Banca agricola italiana
Banco di Roma
Credito marittimo
Banco di Santo Spirito
Banco di Sicilia
Banca Toscana
Banca del Trentino e dell'Alto Adige
Banca dells Marche e degli Abrusui
Banca italiana di credito a valori
Banca nauionale dell'agricoltura
Banca agricola commercials di Pavia
Banta delle Veneuie
Cassa di risparmio di Fiume,
and many other banks
Societa Cogne
Bonifiche Ferraresi,
and other firms controlled by banks
Whilst many banks received help and returned nothing or next to nothing,
some, such as the Banca di sconto, the Banca agricola italiana and the Banco
di Roma, abandoned their holdings of industrial and commercial stocks to
the Istituto di liquidasione; some of these participations were sold, and
the rest formed the nucleus of the extensive holdings of the Istituto di
ricostrusione industriale ( IRI ) formed in 1933. The losses suffered by
the Istituto are estimated to have reached 5 billion lire mark, an enormous
sum in those days when the lira was worth far more than now.
The world depression which followed upon the New York stock market
crash affected Italy severe3,y, coming as it did after a revaluation of the
lira which many regard as having adversely affected the export trade, and
through the export trade, the banks and the econor. The banks were affect-
ed by the considerable fall in stock prices and by the contraction of deposits,
but would not part from their holdings of stocks, so that they could maintain
payments solely through recourse to the Bank of Italy. The creation by the
government of the IMI, Istituto mobiliare italiano, did not provide a solution
to this difficult situation. Finally the desire to limit the pressure on the
Bank of Italy, and to substitute to it a recourse to the financial market led
to the formation of a now famous organization, the IRI, Istituto di ricostrusione
industrials, which plays an important, perhaps dominant role in Italian economic
life.
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This IRI was formed in 1933 with two distinct sections, one called
the financing section and the other the "sesione smobilissi".
The first section was to extend financial help to businesses in grave
danger, and received requests amounting to 2745 million granting assist-
ance to the extent of 1209 million distributed as follows:
322 m. for corporations exe cuting public work.
183 m. for companies producing electric energy
400 m. for telephone companies
65 a. for mechanical and metallurgical companies
239 a. for various corporations
With an improvement of economic conditions, this section was abolished (1936).
The second section which continued the Istituto di liquidasioni, re-
ceived an annual subsidy of 85 million and was to administer the holdings
which had been previously owned by the banks. It turned out that these
banks had, through holding societies such as the SocietA finansiaria italiana
"Sofindit" etc ., control of a large proportion of their own stock, so
that the IRI became the owner of 94% of the shares of the Banca commerciale
italiana, of 78% of the shares of the Credito italiano and of 94% of the
shares of the Banco di Roma. Industrial participations acquired by the IRI
were over 12 billion lire, debts to the Bank of Italy reached 5 billion lire.
In order to straighten out the situation without more recourse to the Bank
of Italy -- which was already too much involved -- the IRI was given wide
powers to sell stocks or property to acquire same, and above all to float
bonds which had this pecularity that they could eventually be transformed
into shares a minimumn interest was guaranteed and the promise of higher in-
terest was held out in case of industrial success. The reaction of the public
was favorable, it subscribed and then did make use of the right to transform
the bonds into shares ot ownership. It became possible to reduce the indebt-
edness to the Bank of Italy. However, this was made at taxpayer's expense,
the losses being estimated at 6 billion lirej if we add to this sum the 5
billion lire lost by the Istituto di liquidasione, we arrive at an impressive
total of 1 billion lire,
The principal operations of the IRI were these:
1. Taking over the groups S.L.P. and S.T.E.T. ( electricity and telephones )
whilst floating 400 million lire's worth of IRI:-STET bonds.
2. Refinancing the UNES, a large electrical concern on the verge of bank-.
ruptcy, to the tune of 276 million lire, part of which there was good prospect
of recuperating.
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3* Liquidating the Credito marittimo and the Banco di Santo Sptrito
with an eventual financial assistance of 300 million lire.
4. A esisting the merchant marine through the creation of the "Fin-
-Mre" with a capital of 900 million. To Finmare were given the shares of
the companies taken over by the IRI. The plan involved the floatation of
900 million lire's worth of IRI-MARE bonds0
5. Constituting the "Finsider" with a capital of 900 million lire to
which were attributed the shares which the IRI had acquired in the Ilva,
Alti forni e acciaierie d'Italia, Terni -- Societ italiana acciaierie di
Cornigliano, all of these being steel companies. 900 million lire of IRI-
FERRO bonds were sold on the market 0 In 1939 the capital of the Finsider
was doubled.
6. Intervening in shipbuilding, cellulose, rubber and other industries.
Thus the IRI, administering as it does an important fraction of Italian
industry, is one of the largest factors in the demand for investment capital.
But since an organisation of this type finances itself by bond floatations,
it has no access to the financial market during inflationary periods. During
the war, the endowment of the IRI was increased from 2 billion to 60 billion
lire -- it is now 120 billion lire; in 1947 alone, 15 billion had to be ad-
vanced by the Treasury. Only in 1948 did the IRI endeavor to secure funds
from the market through the disposal of bonds; this financing was inadequate
until 1949, a year of falling prices in Italy. A critical article publish-
ed recently in the weelely "Il Mondo" asserts that a great deal of the
investment in mechanical concerns is merely payment of the deficit rather
than investment in the normal sense of the word0 According to the same
source, the percentage of national industrial output produced by IRI affil-
iates has increased in the last two years0
An important consequence of all this on the banking system is that
the banks, formed on the German type, are now said to be of the "Anglo-
Saxon type", that is, the deposit banks are now engaged almost exclusively
in short-term operations, a tendency which has been accentuated during the
war, possibly because in a period of rapidly rising prices and abnormal
conditions, there is a reluctance to part with purchasing power ( control
over things ) for a long time0
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THE ISTITUTO MOBILIARE ITALIANO
This organism was created in 1931 in order to alleviate the severe
crisis then prevailing, with a capital of 551. million lire, half of which
was subscribed by the Cassa depositi e prestiti, the other half being taken
by savings banks, other credit institutes, and insurance companies. It
was authorized to grant long term loans to industrial enterprises and to
float bonds on the market in order to get the money it was going to J3and.
It is restricted in its activities by a set of regulations, often modified,
concerning how much can be lent, for how long this much can be lent, etc.
In the years immediately preoeding the 2nd world war, the Istituto
mobiliare was to embark on the financing of national economic autachy,
that is, on the financing of operations presenting "special risks"( read: subsidising ventures economically absurd ) also through bond
floatations. Special provisions were also taken to help certain in.-
dustries such as shipb1Miding and the cinema.
And during the world war the Istituto mobiliare was, naturally enough,
supposed to help finance the war effort and industries directly connected
with warlike activities.
The following table gives an idea of the sum involveds
EAR LOANS REQUESTED LOANS GRANTED
1932-33 2.4
1933M3 466
1934-35 225 I2N
1935-t36 413 37
1930-37
1937-38 39 2
1938-39 542
19?39-k0_____________
19 40-l 933 614
17LJ-42 19990
1942a43 "_46951,709---
1943-44 1050 No1
"1944-45 1,14
On March 31st 1945, the
100 million lire
number of loans was 359, 25 of which exceeded
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TABLE V
Istituto mobiliare italiano
Data on the 31st of March of each year
In million lire
YEAR LOANS OUTSTANDING BONDS OUTSTANDING 2 AS A PERTENTAGE OF 1
1933 532 180 34
19 627 524- - -~ a1
19 621 440 71
1 535 3414
1937 506 90
1938 712 545
1939 1 046 861 _41940 . 7  1,133 1,199 78
1941 2,277 1,621 1,718 7
1922 29612 2,529 2,660 65
1943 256 3,716 3,876 -- 7
1944 k31132 4,128 4,435 991945 11_79 .-_ 22_4 97
- J1 9k47 12,237 11,12i
1948 22,268 21,185
1949 -42-~P395E- 36,'956
The series "bonds outstanding" extending from 1933 to 1945 is extracted
from table XXXII, page 245 of the report presented to the Constituent
Assembly by the Economic Comnission ( vol. IV . 1. ).
The series "bonds outstanding" extending from 1940 to 1949 appears in
the Anrnario statistico 1949-50 table 348, page 325,
The difference between the two series is presumably due to the fact that
the second series includes those bonds which have been selected by a chance
process for reimbursement.
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VI SHORT TERM INTEREST RATES AND THE BANKING CARTEL
If one opens the Italian statistical year book at the page which
contains data concerning the cost of money, one finds that a set of data
refers to the rates of the cartel "cartello bancario".
This banking cartel, which had been preceded, before the first world
war, by a system of agreements, was constituted in 1919 by the four largest
institutes of ordinary credit in order to set a pattern of passive and act-
ive rates, that in a mart mim rate to be paid by the banks to the depositors,
and a minimum rate to be paid to the bank by the borrowers.
1919 had been a year marked by serious inflation and by a return from
a war economy to a peace economy both factors making for an excessive de-W
mand for credit. Banks which were limited in their lending activities by
the volume of deposits they could collect, were offering very high interest
to would be depositors, in fact they were offering a rate higher than the
official discount rate and about identical to that offered by government
bonds. This cartel was gradually extended to include a large nmber of banks
and it seems agreed that it did notably influence the structure of interest
rates.
It is sometimes pointed out that the banking cartel was not a pure re-
strictive organisation amidng solely at improving the profitability of the
participating firms irrespective of what the consequence might be to others.
For instance it is asserted that, without the cartel, the banking bus-
iness would have been conducted, in view of the abnormal prevailing conditions,
in such a way as to imperil the banks and with them the depositors, the cli-
ents and the economy in general*
However, many economists are of the opinion that the cartel had unfort-w
unate consequences on the development of banking because it placed the banks
in a situation analogous to that of an industry protected by a customs tar-
iff, i.e. it assured the survival of uneconomic marginal firms, thus over-e
charging customers while assuring to the best firms a rent corresponding to
the difference between what marginal cost is in the industry and what it might
be without the cartel.
The banking cartel brought about a reduction of rates paid to depositors,
and it is extremely difficult to ascertain whether this has contributed to
reduce appreciably the flow of saving and whether it has channeled savings
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1.
outside of the banking system. However, the report of the Economic
Commission to the Constituent Assembly expressed the wish that in the
future rates paid out to depositors should be determined by the situation
of the money market rather than by the interests of the banks.
hilst passive rates were mximum rates, active rates demanded by
the banks to the borrowers were in reality mininmn rates because they applied
to loan requests of the best customers in the best conditions, so that the
banks were at liberty to charge more, provided that the market conditions
permitted them to do so. In effect, then, cowtition between the banks
was restricted or eliminated whenever the rates left to themselves would
have fallen to low levels, a low level in Italy being what in many other
countries would be characterised as a pretty high level.
A few observations may be made here.6 When the active rates of the
cartel went up to very high levels in 1925, they merely followed i mmdiately
the rise in the official discount rate; but when they declined from Jan-
uary to June 1928, they did so on their own, so to speak, or more exactly
under the influence of the changing money market conditions, since they pre-
ceded the decline of the official discount rate. A new rise in the rates
early in 1929 is also parallel to the rise of the official discount rate.
From 1932 to 1936 there were no active rates set up by the cartel. From 1937
on, the cartel rates change whilst the official discount rate does not do
so until 1944.
It seems clear that there is in Italy an auundance of reasons why the
interest rates should be high, the most important of which is presumably
a low rate of saving. But it is doubtful that preventing the fall of interest
rates in a systematic way is a method which serves the public interest; to
begin with, if it is conceivable that depositors should be given scm sort
of protection it is less clear that the shareholders of banks are entitled to
sam, thus constituting a privileged class among the country's investore;
since a fall in interest rates often, though not always, is caused by a de-
terioration in business conditions, it does not appear desirable to peg the
interest rates at a high level, whilst the prices paid by the market for the
produce of the would be borrowers is falling.
It is not suggested that banks should be forced to extend credit to
firms which are not credit-worthy, but it is suggested that there is no
reason why the difficult situation of credit-worthy firm should be made
even more difficult,
Also covered by the cartel were the prices to be charged by the banks
for the services they perform for their clients; in the past many of these
services were free, as this gratuity was meant to induoe businesses and
l Many banks, especially savings banks, insist that the rate of saving is
almost completely inelastic with respect to the rate of interest.
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capitalists to increase their transactions with the banks other services were
priced by each bank acting individually.
The banks observe that the rise in the price they demand for perform.
ing services corresponds to the rise in the costs they incur. However,
two types of remuneration exist, one which is a percentage charge and the
other which is a fixed charge. The increase in the fixed charges from 1934'
to 195 have been modest, the increase in the percentage charges more con-
spicuous. It would be necessary to see the detailed accounts of the banks in
order to ascertain whether, under the cartel system, there has been an increase
in price much superior to the increase in cost. The report of the Economic
Commission to the Constituent Assembly apparently could not say whether Uis
was the case, and merely recommended great caution in permitting arW rise in
prices in order to protect the customers of the banks. Such a text Implies
that in order to raise a price, the cartel -- or the bank, if the cartel
should be abolished -- should demonstrate to some responsible authority that
there has been a rise in costs i.e. should produce accounts and evidence.
In the beginning, the observance of the cartel agreements was not made
the object of a strict control as the participants relied on the "esprit de
corps" of the firms; a committee presided by the President of the Banking
Association was formed in order to examine infractions, and it could, in
principle, fine the banks which had failed to act as agreed. The rigour of
the control was increased in 1930 and in 1932, providing for the necessity
of investigating complaints, for large miniuma fines and other sanctions, and
for eventual dismissal of the "guilty" personnel. The banking law of 1936
envisaged very heavy fines up to 100,000 and 200,000 lire. It seems that
infractions concerned more frequently the passive rates than the active rates,
and that their frequency depended on the evolution of money market conditions;furthermore they were more frequently committed by the local branches than
by the head offices, This system of fines, punishment and denniation is
an unpleasant one, all the more so, if the social interest of the cartel
agreement is in doubt; furthermore, it does not appear right that individuals
or organisations should be punished for the non-execution of what is in essence
a private agreement. The analogy with the American "fair trade" lavs is a
fairly close one.
It appears that banking circles are strongly of the opinion that the
cartel is not only useful but indispensable, whilst the contrary opinion Is
voiced among the customers of the banks. It is also asserted that may
banking concerns could very well withstand the conditions of coMetition
which would follow the abandonaent of the cartel,
A possible consequence of the banking cartel was the uniformity of the
rates adopted irrespective of local conditions; but i is clear that the
very existence of large banks with branches all over the country tends to
bring about such a state of affairs.
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One important aspect of the cartel is its incidence on the div -
ergence of the active and passive rates. There is little question thatfrom 1919 on this divergence has been growing, which means that whilst
the borrower pays a high price, more and more ct the proceeds go to the
banks, less and less to the savers. Indeed the divergence Is held to
have increased by 50% from the prewar to the postwar, and the trend sem
to have maintained itself subsequently as indicated by the data of the
Annuario statistico, Serie V -- vol. 1, p. 331 table 347. And Italy is
a country which could benefit from increased saving and reduced l1mwry
spending.
Professor Einaudi, who is actually the President of the Italian
Republic, had pointed out the undesirability of a further measure of
divergence between passive and active rates and indicated the necessity
of curbing the growing expenses of the banking system. If expenses are
understood in the strict sese, that is as those expenses, not including
the banks' profits, which are indispensable to the operation of the
banking system, then it is important to keep in mind that .such expenses
consist essentially, up to 85% approximately, of wages, salaries, pen-
sions, etc...
It is of interest to note that the Report of the Economic Commission
to the Constituent Assembly is, on the whole, critical of the cartel
system, as it regards it as incompatible with a market economr and as a
brake on productive activity in general.
